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Privacy Revisited: GPS Tracking 
as Search and Seizure 
 
Bennett L. Gershman 
 
The seminal decision in Katz v. United States1 changed the 
way we look at the Fourth Amendment.  Prior to Katz, a 
Fourth Amendment search typically required an intrusion by 
government into a “protected area.”2  But as Katz famously 
declared, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”3  
Nevertheless, the “place” where the privacy is sought—in Katz, 
a telephone booth—remains a critical reference in determining 
the constitutional protection that people are afforded.  That 
Katz may have relied on the privacy of the telephone booth to 
place his call, according to the majority, was constitutionally 
significant, but it proved to be an uncertain gauge of protected 
privacy from governmental intrusions into other places.  The 
concurring opinion by Justice John Harlan more explicitly 
addressed the extent to which a person‟s reliance on the 
privacy of the “place” affords constitutional protection: “first . . . 
a person [must] have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second . . . the expectation [must] be 
one that society is prepared to recognize as „reasonable.‟”4 
Post-Katz Supreme Court decisions—and there are many—
have tried to clarify the second part of Justice Harlan‟s 
formulation: the reasonableness of a subjective expectation of 
privacy.5  Expectations of privacy that the Supreme Court has 
 
  Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. 
1. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
2. Id. at 351 n.9 (“It is true that this Court has occasionally described its 
conclusions in terms of „constitutionally protected areas,‟ but we have never 
suggested that this concept can serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth 
Amendment problem.”) (internal citations omitted). 
3. Id. at 351.  The Court explicitly overruled Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U.S. 438 (1928), which had held that electronic surveillance, without any 
trespass to property and without any seizure of tangible objects, fell outside 
the purview of the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 352-53. 
4. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
5. The Court has often used the terms “reasonable,” “justifiable,” and 
“legitimate” interchangeably to characterize the objective part of the Katz 
1
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considered to be reasonable include conversations believed by 
all of the parties to be confidential,6 non-commercial activities 
in the home,7 external manipulation of luggage,8 the interior of 
the home from tracking by a beeper,9 and the interior of the 
home from heat-revealing technology.10  By contrast, 
expectations of privacy that the Supreme Court has considered 
to be unreasonable include garbage placed on the curb for 
collection,11 open fields with “no trespassing” signs,12 out-of-
door activities within one‟s home13 and the workplace,14 the 
routes traveled by an automobile,15 telephone numbers dialed,16 
conversations with a false friend,17 commercial activities in the 
home,18 drugs that are accessible to a canine‟s scent,19 and 
drugs that can be identified by scientific tests.20 
As the above examples suggest, the Supreme Court‟s 
attempt to distinguish between expectations of privacy that are 
reasonable and those that are not reasonable has been at best 
uncertain, and subject to criticism.21  Much of the uncertainty 
 
test.  See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-78 (1984) 
(“legitimate” and “reasonable”); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749, 
752 (1971) (“justifiable”); Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 361 (“justifiable” and 
“reasonable”). 
6. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
7. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990). 
8. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000). 
9. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
10. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
11. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
12. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
13. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 
207 (1986). 
14. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
15. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
16. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
17. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
18. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998); Lewis v. United States, 385 
U.S. 206 (1966). 
19. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); United States v. Place, 462 
U.S. 696 (1983). 
20. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
21. See, e.g., Donald L. Doernberg, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: 
Expectations of Privacy, False Friends, and the Perils of Speaking Under the 
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 39 IND. L. REV. 253, 295 
(2006) (criticizing the Supreme Court‟s “muddled view of privacy”); Peter P. 
Swire, Katz is Dead.  Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV. 904, 923-31 (2004) 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/5
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and criticism is attributable to several factors: the nature and 
extent of the methods used by government to intrude into 
private places; the varying nature and extent of privacy 
interests over a broad range of places and activities; and most 
importantly, the role that modern technology plays in enabling 
the government to intrude into places and activities that 
previously were inaccessible.22  Indeed, the threat to individual 
privacy from the “fantastic advances in the field of electronic 
communication” that Chief Justice Warren warned about 
nearly fifty years ago23 seems almost benign compared to 
advances in satellite and radar surveillance technology that 
allow the government to secretly spy, track, and record private 
conduct on an unprecedented scale.24 
Given this uncertainty, it should not be surprising that the 
Supreme Court‟s Katz expectation-of-privacy jurisprudence has 
encouraged state courts to reject what is considered a confusing 
and restrictive interpretation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment, and to provide broader protection to their citizens 
under their own state constitutions.25  Among the most 
prominent advocates of aggressively using state constitutions 
to expand individual rights has been the New York State Court 
of Appeals.26  Thus, in examining the Supreme Court‟s Katz-
 
(discussing the inadequacy of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test). 
22. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) (“It would be 
foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth 
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”). 
23. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) (Warren, C.J., 
concurring in the result). 
24. See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36 n.3 (describing radar-based ability to 
enable law enforcement to see individuals through walls); Renée McDonald 
Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 
55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 414-21 (2007) (providing extensive discussion of origin, 
science, and uses of GPS technology); Ian James Samuel, Note, Warrantless 
Location Tracking, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1324, 1327 (2008) (discussing the 
technological capacity of GPA to track down persons who use cell phones to 
within a range of a few meters anywhere on the globe). 
25. See generally Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State 
Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 
1141 (1985); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection 
of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
26. See Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: 
Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 
(1995). 
3
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expectation-of-privacy decisions,27 as well as other search and 
seizure decisions,28 the New York Court of Appeals has 
concluded that the Supreme Court‟s interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment offers insufficient protection for New York 
citizens, and has invoked the State Constitution‟s search and 
seizure provision of Article I, Section 12 to afford greater 
protection.29 
Last term, the New York State Court of Appeals once 
 
27. See, e.g., People v. Keta, 593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992) (search of 
vehicle dismantling business); People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992) 
(search of open fields); People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054 (N.Y. 1990) (canine 
sniff); People v. Torres, 543 N.E.2d 61 (N.Y. 1989) (search of passenger 
compartment of vehicle); People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 556 (N.Y. 
1986) (probable cause for search warrant authorizing seizure of obscene 
materials); People v. Gokey, 457 N.E.2d 723 (N.Y. 1983) (warrantless search 
of bag in defendant‟s possession). 
28. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298 (N.Y. 1993) (rejecting the 
“plain feel” exception to warrant requirement); People v. Harris, 570 N.E.2d 
1051 (N.Y. 1991) (statements were fruit of unlawful entry); People v. Vilardi, 
555 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 1990) (standard for non-disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence); People v. Griminger, 524 N.E.2d 409 (N.Y. 1988) (rejecting the 
totality of circumstances test for reliability of informant statements); People 
v. Millan, 508 N.E.2d 903 (N.Y. 1987) (allowing standing for constructive 
possession); People v. Stith, 506 N.E.2d 911 (N.Y. 1987) (restricting the 
inevitable discovery rule); People v. Class, 494 N.E.2d 444 (N.Y. 1986) (search 
of vehicle for VIN number); People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985) 
(rejecting the good faith exception to exclusionary rule); People v. Johnson, 
488 N.E.2d 439 (N.Y. 1985) (reliability of informant‟s statements); People v. 
Belton, 432 N.E.2d 745 (N.Y. 1982) (automobile search incident to arrest). 
29. N.Y. CONST., art. I, § 12 provides: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable 
interception of telephone and telegraph communications 
shall not be violated, and ex parte orders or warrants shall 
issue only upon oath or affirmation that there is reasonable 
ground to believe that evidence of crime may be thus 
obtained, and identifying the particular means of 
communication, and particularly describing the person or 
persons whose communications are to be intercepted and 
the purpose thereof. 
 
Id. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/5
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again invoked the State Constitution in a search and seizure 
case that examined a massive and prolonged use by law 
enforcement agents of Global Positioning System (“GPS”) 
surveillance technology to monitor a motorist‟s travels.  In 
People v. Weaver, the Court of Appeals held that the 
surreptitious attachment by law enforcement agents of a GPS 
tracking device to the underside of the defendant‟s vehicle and 
the continuous monitoring of his movements for sixty-five 
consecutive days constituted a “search” under the New York 
State Constitution that required a warrant.30  The Court of 
Appeals split 4-3 in this decision.  The majority and dissenting 
opinions gave carefully reasoned arguments on the difficult, 
and indeed “momentous,”31 privacy issue presented—the 
impact of sophisticated and highly intrusive surveillance 
technology on society‟s subjective and objectively reasonable 
expectations of so-called “locational privacy,”32 and the ability 
of law enforcement to employ powerful new technology to 
investigate crime without being subjected to constitutional 
constraints. 
Part I of this Article discusses the facts in People v. 
Weaver, the majority and dissenting opinions in the Appellate 
Division, Third Department decision, and the majority and 
dissenting opinions in the Court of Appeals decision.  Part II 
addresses the question that has yet to be decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court—whether GPS tracking of a vehicle by law 
enforcement constitutes a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Part III addresses the separate question that the 
Court of Appeals did not address in Weaver—whether the 
surreptitious attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle 
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.  The 
Article concludes that law enforcement‟s use of a GPS device to 
track the movements of a vehicle continuously for an extended 
 
30. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009). 
31. See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007). 
32. See Adam Cohen, A Casualty of the Technology Revolution: 
“Locational Privacy”, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, at A28.  See also Dorothy J. 
Glancy, Privacy on the Open Road, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 295 (2004); 
McDonald Hutchins, supra note 24; April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking 
Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s 
Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661 
(2005); Samuel, supra note 24. 
5
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period of time is a serious intrusion into a motorist‟s reasonable 
expectation of privacy that constitutes a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Moreover, although the issue is 
somewhat murkier, the attachment of the GPS device to a 
vehicle may also constitute a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
I.  People v. Weaver 
 
A. Factual Setting 
 
On December 21, 2005, between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m., 
Investigator Peter Minehan, assigned to the “electronic and 
physical surveillance” unit of the New York State Police, 
crawled under a Dodge van belonging to Scott Weaver that was 
parked on the street outside Weaver‟s home, and attached a 
magnetized, battery-operated GPS tracking device to the metal 
frame of the van‟s bumper.33  The tracking device remained in 
place for sixty-five days, continuously monitoring the position 
and speed of the van and its location.34  This non-stop 
surveillance was conducted without a warrant.35  Evidence 
from the GPS device was admitted at trial to establish 
Weaver‟s guilt in the burglary of a K-Mart department store.36 
The GPS tracking device that was attached to Weaver‟s 
van is known as “Q-ball,” and is one of many GPS brands that 
operate from several of the current twenty-nine GPS satellites 
in orbit.37  The Q-ball receiver is able to calculate a vehicle‟s 
latitude, longitude, and altitude by listening to and processing 
location information.38  The device tracks, records, and reports 
every movement and every location of the vehicle, and gives 
readings every minute while the vehicle is in motion or is 
stationary.39  As Investigator Minehan testified, an investigator 
 
33. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1195. 
34. Id. at 1195-96. 
35. Id. at 1196. 
36. Id. 
37. Id.  See McDonald Hutchins, supra note 24, at 414-21, for an 
extensive discussion of the history, science, and functions of GPS technology. 
38. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1196. 
39. Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/5
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using a GPS tracking device could log on to his computer at 
home while watching a football game and track a vehicle in 
real time.40  To download the location information, the 
investigator would drive past the vehicle and simply press a 
button on a corresponding GPS receiver unit, causing the 
tracking history to be received and saved by a computer in the 
investigator‟s vehicle.41  The Q-ball used to monitor Weaver 
tracked, recorded, and reported his van‟s movements and 
locations every hour of every day over the course of sixty-five 
days.42 
Following an investigation, Weaver and another man, John 
Chiera, were charged with two separate burglaries—one 
committed in July 2005, at the Latham Meat Market, and the 
other at the Latham K-Mart on Christmas Eve of the same 
year.43  Weaver and Chiera were tried separately.44  Evidence 
from the GPS tracking device was admitted at Weaver‟s trial 
and showed that on December 24, 2005, at 7:26 p.m., Weaver‟s 
van drove through the K-mart parking lot at a speed of six 
miles per hour and left the parking lot two minutes later.45  
This proof was introduced by the prosecution to corroborate the 
testimony of Amber Roche, who had stated that on the date of 
the K-Mart burglary, she had driven through the K-Mart 
parking lot with Weaver and John Chiera while the two men 
looked for the best place to break into the store.46  Roche 
testified that later that night, Weaver and Chiera left Roche‟s 
apartment wearing dark clothing, and that when they 
returned, Chiera‟s hand was bleeding.47  Other evidence 
showed that during the burglary, a glass jewelry case was 
smashed and stained with blood that contained DNA matching 
 
40. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 4 n.1, People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 
1195 (N.Y. 2009) (No. 2009-0053), 2008 WL 6002281. 
41. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1196. 
42. Id. at 1195-96.  The Court of Appeals noted that the record is unclear 
as to why Weaver was placed under electronic surveillance.  Id. at 1196. 
43. Id. 
44. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 40, at 6.  Chiera and the 
prosecution initially agreed to a plea bargain.  However, the county court 
judge refused to accept the plea because Chiera would not agree to testify 
against Weaver.  Id. at 8. 
45. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1196. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
7
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Chiera‟s.48 
A witness for K-Mart testified for the prosecution that the 
store closed on Christmas Eve at 9:00 p.m. and that after being 
alerted later that night by store managers, he returned to the 
store to find police and canine units going through the store.49  
Burglars apparently had cut through a metal fence leading to 
the garden shop, broke open the garden shop door, entered the 
store, broke open four jewelry cases, and left their blood on the 
glass.50  A garbage bag full of jewelry and bolt cutters was 
discovered on the floor.51  During summation, the prosecution 
reminded the jury that the GPS data showed “where Mr. 
Weaver went on Christmas Eve,” driving randomly from place 
to place without stopping anywhere, unlike what “reasonable 
people” would do on Christmas Eve.52  The prosecutor argued 
that, from the GPS data, “there is proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that this defendant, Scott Weaver, was waiting outside, 
making John Scott Chiera go in and leave his blood at the 
scene of the K-Mart.”53  The jury found Weaver guilty of 
Burglary in the Third Degree and Attempted Grand Larceny in 
the Second Degree, and the court sentenced him to concurrent 
terms of two and one-third to seven years on each of the two 
convictions.54 
 
B. Appellate Division 
 
On appeal to the Appellate Division, Third Department, 
Weaver argued, among other claims, that the warrantless 
attachment of the GPS device to his van violated his rights 
under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well 
as his rights under Article I, Section 12 of the New York State 
Constitution.55  The court, with one justice dissenting, rejected 
 
48. Id. 
49. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 40, at 10. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 24. 
53. Id. 
54. See Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1196; Brief for Defendant-Appellant, 
supra note 40, at 24. 
55. People v. Weaver, 860 N.Y.S.2d 223, 224 (App. Div. 2008). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/5
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the argument.  According to the majority opinion by Justice 
Robert S. Rose, a person has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the publicly accessible exterior of his or her vehicle 
or in the undercarriage of the vehicle.56  Moreover, the court 
observed, it is unreasonable for a motorist to expect privacy as 
to the route and movement of his or her vehicle on public 
streets.57  Police, said the court, are allowed to use “science and 
technology to enhance or augment their ability to surveil that 
which is already public.”58  Constant visual surveillance of 
Weaver‟s van in public view, the court concluded, would have 
been just as intrusive as using the GPS device to monitor his 
movements, and no warrant would have been required to do so, 
under either the U.S. Constitution or the New York State 
Constitution.59 
Justice Leslie E. Stein dissented.60  She believed that the 
constant surveillance of Weaver‟s van by use of a GPS device 
“has far-reaching implications and has never been addressed 
by any appellate court of this state.”61  A GPS device, Justice 
Stein observed, enables the government “to acquire an 
enormous amount of personal information about the citizen.”62  
Grounding her opinion in the protections of the New York State 
Constitution rather than the U.S. Constitution, Justice Stein 
argued that while a person may not enjoy a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a public place from police surveillance 
at any given moment, “they do have a reasonable expectation 
that their every move will not be continuously and indefinitely 
monitored by a technical device without their knowledge, 
except where a warrant has been issued based on probable 
 
56. Id. at 225. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 227 (Stein, J., dissenting). 
61. Id. (Stein, J., dissenting).  Several lower courts in New York, 
however, have addressed the issue.  See, e.g., People v. Gant, 802 N.Y.S.2d 
839 (Westchester Co. Ct. 2005) (in absence of exigent circumstances, warrant 
was required to attach GPS to car); People v. Lacey, 787 N.Y.S.2d 680 
(Nassau Co. Ct. 2004), aff’d, 887 N.Y.S.2d 158 (App. Div. 2009) (use of GPS 
did not violate Fourth Amendment). 
62. Weaver, 860 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (Stein, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. 
Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003) (en banc)). 
9
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cause.”63  Justice Stein granted Weaver leave to appeal to the 
Court of Appeals.64 
 
C. Court of Appeals: Majority Opinion of Chief Judge 
Lippman 
 
The Court of Appeals reversed in a 4-3 decision.65  The 
majority opinion, written by Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman, 
and joined by Judges Carmen Beauchamp Ciparick, Eugene F. 
Pigott, Jr., and Theodore T. Jones, viewed the GPS tracking 
device as “an enormous unsupervised intrusion by the police 
agencies of government upon personal privacy.”66  This 
intrusion, the majority said, recalled the government‟s 
unsupervised use of wiretapping eighty-one years earlier, 
which had provoked Justice Louis Brandeis‟s famous dissent in 
Olmstead v. United States67 where he condemned the 
government for its lawless behavior and included the 
memorable language that a person has “the right to be let 
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men.”68  Describing the GPS device as “this 
dragnet use of the technology at the sole discretion of law 
enforcement authorities to pry into the details of people‟s daily 
lives,”69 the majority asserted that the government had 
engaged in lawless behavior and that judicial intervention was 
required.70 
The majority began its analysis by focusing on one of the 
Supreme Court‟s post-Katz decisions that had examined 
whether law enforcement‟s use of an electronic device to 
monitor the route of a motorist constituted a search under the 
 
63. Id. (Stein, J., dissenting). 
64. See Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1197. 
65. Id. at 1213. 
66. Id. at 1202. 
67. 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
68. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
69. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1203. 
70. See id. at 1201 (stating that the government‟s conduct involved a 
“massive invasion of privacy . . . inconsistent with even the slightest 
reasonable expectation of privacy”).  See also id. at 1203 (“Without judicial 
oversight, the use of these powerful devices presents a significant and, to our 
minds, unacceptable risk of abuse.”). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/5
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Fourth Amendment.  In United States v. Knotts, law 
enforcement agents placed a beeper in a five-gallon drum of 
chloroform and tracked the movement of a vehicle in which the 
container was transported by using both visual surveillance 
and by monitoring the signals from the beeper.71  The Supreme 
Court held that no Fourth Amendment search occurred: “A 
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in his [or her] movements 
from one place to another.”72  This is so, the Supreme Court 
explained, because any member of the public “who wanted to 
look” could observe the route taken by the vehicle, the stops it 
made, and its ultimate destination, and therefore any claim to 
privacy that the motorist may have subjectively expected would 
be unreasonable.73  Indeed, the Supreme Court observed, 
“[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from 
augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth 
with such enhancement as science and technology afforded 
them in this case.”74 
The majority in Weaver conceded that Knotts appeared to 
be a formidable precedent that would seem to allow police 
investigators to use virtually any type of surveillance 
technology to track the progress of a vehicle on public roads.75  
However, as the majority pointed out, there are significant 
differences between the “very primitive tracking device” in 
Knotts, and the “vastly different and exponentially more 
sophisticated and powerful technology” of a GPS device.76  The 
beeper in Knotts, the majority noted, was used for a limited and 
discrete purpose—to learn the destination of a particular 
 
71. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983) (pursuing agents 
followed the car but lost visual contact when the driver made evasive 
maneuvers and the agents lost the beeper signal; but the agents retrieved the 
signal with assistance from a monitoring device located in a helicopter). 
72. Id. at 281. 
73. Id. at 281-82. 
74. Id. at 282. 
75. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1198-99 (“At first blush, it would appear that 
Knotts does not bode well for Mr. Weaver, for in his case, as in Knotts, the 
surveillance technology was utilized for the purpose of tracking the progress 
of a vehicle over what may be safely supposed to have been predominantly 
public roads.”). 
76. Id. 
11
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item.77  The beeper merely served to enhance the sensory 
faculties of the police to enable them to follow the vehicle 
closely and maintain actual visual contact, which the Supreme 
Court compared to the agent‟s use of a searchlight, marine 
glass, or field glass.78  According to the Weaver majority, the 
GPS device is quantitatively and qualitatively different.  GPS 
has a “remarkably precise tracking capability,”79 and can be 
cheaply and easily deployed to track a car “with uncanny 
accuracy to virtually any interior or exterior location, at any 
time and regardless of atmospheric conditions.”80  Such 
“constant” and “relentless” surveillance, according to the 
majority, is much more intrusive than “a mere enhancement of 
human sensory capacity.”81  Indeed, such tracking, the majority 
observed, “facilitates a new technological perception of the 
world in which the situation of any object may be followed and 
exhaustively recorded over, in most cases, a practically 
unlimited period.”82  For law enforcement to “see” and “capture” 
such information, the majority added, “would require, at a 
minimum, millions of additional police officers and cameras on 
every street lamp.”83 
The implications to personal privacy of using a GPS device, 
the majority further argued, are staggering.  They offered this 
stark portrayal: “[t]he whole of a person‟s progress through the 
world, into both public and private spatial spheres, can be 
charted and recorded over lengthy periods.”84  According to the 
majority, the police would be able to retrieve data that could 
instantaneously describe with “breathtaking quality and 
quantity . . . a highly detailed profile” of where we go, and in 
effect, who we are.85  Illustrative of the kinds of information 
 
77. The government agents had placed a beeper in a five-gallon drum of 
chloroform and followed the container‟s movements, both by visual 
surveillance and with a monitor that received signals from the beeper, as it 
was transported in a vehicle to Knott‟s cabin.  Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278. 
78. Id. at 283. 
79. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. See id. at 1199-1200. 
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that this technology potentially could reveal and record, the 
majority noted, are “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic 
surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the 
strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour 
motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, 
the gay bar and on and on.”86  The majority suggested that by 
using this technology, and by drawing easy inferences, the 
government would be able to assemble patterns of a person‟s 
professional and personal activities and could learn, with 
remarkable precision, his or her political, religious, amicable, 
and amorous associations.87 
In discussing whether Knotts should be the controlling 
doctrine on whether the use of a GPS device involves a 
constitutional search, the majority observed that the use of 
GPS “forces the issue.”88  Notwithstanding that round-the-clock 
GPS surveillance may be extremely popular and have many 
useful applications,89 as the majority acknowledged, this 
widespread use should not be taken as a “massive, 
undifferentiated concession of personal privacy to agents of the 
state.”90  Where there has been no voluntary utilization of this 
tracking technology, and when the GPS is surreptitiously 
installed by the police, there “exists no basis to find an 
expectation of privacy so diminished as to render constitutional 
concerns de minimis.”91  Moreover, the majority observed, the 
Supreme Court in Knotts acknowledged that the Fourth 
 
 
[I]t will be possible to tell from the technology with ever 
increasing precision who we are and are not with, when we 
are and are not with them, and what we do and do not carry 
on our persons—to mention just a few of the highly feasible 
empirical configurations. 
 
Id. at 1200. 
86. Id. at 1199. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 1200. 
89. But see People v. Sullivan, 53 P.3d 1181 (Colo. App. 2002) (husband 
convicted of harassment for use of GPS for stalking); John Schwartz, This 
Car Can Talk.  What It Says May Cause Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2003, 
at C1 (noting some concerns about the potential for overzealous use of GPS 
tracking systems in automobiles by law enforcement and others). 
90. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1200. 
91. Id. 
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Amendment issue would be more directly presented if “twenty-
four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country [were] 
possible, without judicial knowledge or supervision.”92 
The Weaver majority conceded that the expectation of 
privacy in a car upon a public thoroughfare is diminished.93  
Nevertheless, according to the majority, “a ride in a motor 
vehicle does not so completely deprive its occupants of any 
reasonable expectation of privacy.”94  According to the majority, 
a motorist operating on public roads retains a “residual privacy 
expectation” which, “while perhaps small, was at least 
adequate to support his claim of a violation of his constitutional 
right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures.”95  This 
is particularly so, the majority argued, given the “massive 
invasion of privacy entailed by the prolonged use of the GPS 
device [which] was inconsistent with even the slightest 
reasonable expectation of privacy.”96 
Observing that neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the 
vast majority of federal circuit courts had yet addressed the 
question of whether the use of GPS in criminal investigations 
constitutes a “search” under the Fourth Amendment,97 the 
majority chose to ground its decision in the New York State 
Constitution‟s Article I, Section 12—the state analogue to the 
Fourth Amendment—rather than in the Fourth Amendment 
itself.98  The majority noted that it had on numerous occasions 
interpreted the State Constitution‟s search and seizure 
provision to afford greater protection to New York State 
citizens than the protections afforded under the Fourth 
Amendment.99  Indeed, according to the majority, invoking the 
 
92. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 
276, 283 (1983)). 
93. Id. 
94. Id.  See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979) (“An individual 
operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all reasonable 
expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its use are subject 
to government regulation.”). 
95. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1201. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 1202. 
98. Id. (“In light of the unsettled state of federal law on the issue, we 
premise our ruling on our State Constitution alone.”). 
99. Id.  The majority cited as “persuasive” the conclusions of two other 
state courts that held the warrantless use of a tracking device a violation 
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State Constitution is appropriate in order to prevent “the 
consequent marginalization of the State Constitution and 
judiciary in matters crucial to safeguarding the privacy of our 
citizens.”100 
 
D. Dissenting Opinion by Judge Smith 
 
Judge Robert S. Smith dissented, joined by Judges Victoria 
A. Graffeo and Susan P. Read.  Smith‟s dissenting opinion 
criticized as “illogical” and “doomed to fail” the majority‟s 
attempt to find in the State Constitution a distinction between 
ordinary means of observation and more efficient high-tech 
means.101  According to Judge Smith, the defendant assumed 
the risk that when he traveled in public places in his car he 
could be followed, photographed, filmed, and recorded on 
videotape wherever he went, “from the psychiatrist‟s office to 
the gay bar.”102  “One who travels on the public streets to such 
destinations,” his dissenting opinion argued, “takes the chance 
that he or she will be observed.”103  Referring to Knotts, Smith‟s 
dissent said that the U.S. Supreme Court drew the “obvious” 
conclusion that “a person‟s movements on public thoroughfares 
are not subject to any reasonable expectation of privacy.”104  
 
under their state constitutions.  See id. at 1203 (referring to State v. Jackson, 
76 P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (absent a warrant, “citizens of this 
State have a right to be free from the type of governmental intrusion that 
occurs when a GPS device is attached to a citizen‟s vehicle”); State v. 
Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1049 (Or. 1988) (absent a warrant, government‟s 
use of a radio transmitter to monitor the location of defendant‟s car was 
“nothing short of a staggering limitation upon personal freedom”)). 
100. Id. at 1202.  See cases cited supra notes 27-28 (search and seizure 
decisions of the New York Court of Appeals invoking the State Constitution). 
101. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1204 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
102. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).  The Smith dissent noted that: 
 
It is beyond any question that the police could, without a 
warrant and without any basis other than a hunch that 
defendant was up to no good, have assigned an officer, or a 
team of officers, to follow him everywhere he went, so long 
as he remained in public places. 
 
Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). 
103. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). 
104. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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Judge Smith criticized the majority for imposing a “totally 
unjustified limitation on law enforcement” by its suggestion 
that because the GPS “is new, and vastly more efficient than 
the investigative tools that preceded it,” it is “simply too good 
to be used without a warrant.”105  The portable camera and 
telephone were once considered new and highly efficient, 
Smith‟s dissent noted, but “[t]he proposition that some devices 
are too modern and sophisticated to be used freely in police 
investigation[s] is not a defensible rule of constitutional law.”106  
Criminals, Smith argued, will try to employ the most modern 
and efficient tools available to them, and do not need a warrant 
to do so.107  To limit police use of these same tools, Smith said, 
“is to guarantee that the efficiency of law enforcement will 
increase more slowly than the efficiency of law breakers.”108  
Citing Kyllo v. United States,109 and United States v. Karo,110 
which had held that law enforcement‟s use of technology to 
monitor activities inside the home constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search, Smith‟s dissent suggested that, rather 
than limiting the technology that investigators may use, the 
court should limit the “places and things they may observe 
with it.”111 
The “hard”112 and “troubling”113 aspect of this case, 
according to Smith, was not the use of the GPS device to track 
the vehicle, but rather the surreptitious attachment of the GPS 
to the defendant‟s car without his consent.114  He viewed the 
attachment of the device as a trespass that, while not a 
violation of the defendant‟s privacy rights, did violate the 
defendant‟s property rights.115  Although a “fine distinction,”116 
 
105. Id. at 1204-05 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
106. Id. at 1204 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
107. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). 
108. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). 
109. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
110. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
111. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1204-05 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
112. Id. at 1205 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
113. Id. at 1204 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
114. Id. at 1205 (Smith, J., dissenting) (“I do not care for the idea of a 
police officer—or anyone else—sneaking under someone‟s car in the middle of 
the night to attach a tracking device.”). 
115. Id. at 1206 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
116. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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Smith‟s dissent concluded that the existence of a property 
interest “does not mean that [the] defendant also had a privacy 
interest.”117  The device was attached to the outside of the car 
while it was parked on a public street, and according to Smith, 
“[n]o one who chooses to park in such a location can reasonably 
think that the outside—even the underside—of the car is in a 
place of privacy.”118  Citing Bond v. United States,119 in which 
the Supreme Court held that an overly intrusive manipulation 
of the exterior of a person‟s luggage constituted a Fourth 
Amendment search, Smith‟s dissent argued that a search 
would occur as a result of a trespass when information is 
acquired that the property owner reasonably expected to keep 
private.120 
 
E. Dissenting Opinion by Judge Read 
 
Judge Read wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which 
Judge Graffeo joined.121  Although she found aspects of this 
case to be “troubling,” particularly the length of time that the 
GPS device was affixed to the defendant‟s car,122 Judge Read 
found more troubling the manner in which the majority 
“brushed aside” the state‟s constitutional jurisprudence, as well 
as its “handcuffing” of the state legislature by 
constitutionalizing a subject that should more properly be dealt 
with legislatively rather than judicially.123  According to Read‟s 
dissent, by “transmut[ing] GPS-assisted monitoring for 
 
117. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting) (emphasis and internal citations 
omitted).  See also id. (Smith, J., dissenting) (“No authority, so far as I know, 
holds that a trespass on private property, without more, is an unlawful 
search when the property is in a public place.”). 
118. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). 
119. 529 U.S. 334 (2000) (search of bus passenger‟s luggage). 
120. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1206 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
121. See id. at 1206 (Read, J., dissenting). 
122. Id. (Read, J., dissenting).  Judge Read claimed that the U.S. 
Supreme Court exempted from the definition of a search under the Fourth 
Amendment the government‟s use of tracking devices “in lieu of or 
supplemental to visual surveillance, so long as the tracking occurs outside 
the home.”  Id. at 1206-07 (Read, J., dissenting).  However, it is unclear 
whether and to what extent the Supreme Court has actually considered 
“substitutes” to a law enforcement agent‟s visual tracking. 
123. Id. (Read, J., dissenting). 
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information that could have been easily gotten by traditional 
physical surveillance into a constitutionally prohibited search,” 
the majority impairs the Court‟s “institutional integrity” and 
“denies New Yorkers the full benefit of the carefully wrought 
balance between privacy and security interests that other 
states have struck for their citizens through legislation.”124 
Judge Read also discussed the dual methodology that has 
been employed by the Court of Appeals when deciding whether 
to apply the State Constitution rather than federal 
constitutional law—an interpretive analysis and a non-
interpretive analysis.  An interpretive analysis is commonly 
used, according to Judge Read, when there are textual 
differences between a provision of the State Constitution and 
its federal counterpart; but this is not a basis, in this case, 
since the language of the Fourth Amendment and the State 
Constitution‟s Article I, Section 12 is the same.125  Non-
interpretative review, according to Read‟s dissent, “proceeds 
from a judicial perception of sound policy, justice and 
fundamental fairness.”126  To the extent that the majority 
based its decision on a non-interpretative methodology, Read 
claimed, the majority‟s analysis “has not come close to 
justifying its holding as a matter of state constitutional law.”127  
Indeed, according to Read‟s dissent, the majority‟s reliance on 
the State Constitution is “standardless,”128 and renders the 
State Constitution “a handy grab bag filled with a bevy of 
clauses [to] be exploited in order to circumvent disfavored 
United States Supreme Court decisions.”129 
Read‟s dissent sought to justify the non-interpretative 
basis for several search and seizure decisions in which the 
Court of Appeals departed from the federal approach—cases 
dealing with the protection of homes,130 private land,131 and the 
 
124. Id. at 1212 (Read, J., dissenting). 
125. Id. at 1207-08 (Read, J., dissenting). 
126. Id. at 1208 (Read, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 
501 N.E.2d 556, 560 (N.Y. 1986)). 
127. Id. (Read, J., dissenting). 
128. Id. at 1210 (Read, J., dissenting). 
129. Id. at 1211 (Read, J., dissenting) (alteration in original and citation 
omitted). 
130. Id. at 1208 (Read, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Harris, 570 
N.E.2d 1051 (N.Y. 1991); People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054 (N.Y. 1990)). 
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interior of an automobile132—and argued that “there is no 
discussion [by the majority in Weaver] of how the reasoning in 
those cases . . . supports deviation from federal precedent in 
this case.”133  Nor, according to the Read dissent, is the 
majority‟s reliance on decisions from other state courts 
interpreting their own state constitutions relevant to a non-
interpretive analysis, which is explicitly linked to factors 
peculiar to the State of New York.134  Moreover, Read added, 
the majority failed to examine relevant New York statutory law 
that regulates police surveillance and that appears to 
contradict the majority‟s imposition of a warrant requirement 
for GPS tracking.135 
Finally, the Read dissent criticized the majority for 
curtailing the state legislature‟s “liberty to act in the best 
interests of the state‟s citizens as a whole.”136  Noting the 
popularity and pervasive use of GPS by private citizens and 
police, Read noted that many states have enacted 
comprehensive legislation governing the use of GPS by police 
for investigative purposes, as well as the procedures required 
to use this technology.137  These statutes, Read said, typically 
require a judicial warrant based on differing levels of factual 
cause.138  To the extent that police surveillance implicates 
competing values of privacy and security, Read‟s dissent 
argued, it would be most appropriate for the state legislature to 
balance these values and fashion a comprehensive regulatory 
program similar to the statutes in other states, which could be 
readily capable of amendment as the technology evolves.139  
However, as Read argued, by constitutionalizing the GPS 
 
131. Id. (Read, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328 
(N.Y. 1992)). 
132. Id. (Read, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Torres, 543 N.E.2d 61 
(N.Y. 1989)). 
133. Id. (Read, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
134. Id. at 1209 (Read, J., dissenting). 
135. Id. at 1210 (Read, J., dissenting) (New York state legislature “has 
enacted elaborate statutory provisions to regulate police surveillance; in 
particular, CPL articles 700 (eavesdropping and video surveillance warrants) 
and 705 (pen registers and trap and trace devices)”). 
136. Id. at 1212 (Read, J., dissenting). 
137. Id. at 1211 (Read, J., dissenting). 
138. Id. (Read, J., dissenting). 
139. Id. at 1211-12 (Read, J., dissenting). 
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monitoring technology, the majority has defined what the 
legislature cannot do and has taken other regulatory 
approaches “off the table.”140  And to the extent that different 
judges will impose different temporal and other procedural 
restrictions on the GPS warrant, she claimed, uniformity will 
be compromised, and the utility of this investigative technique 
will be significantly diminished.141 
 
II.  GPS Tracking as a Search 
 
The decision by the New York Court of Appeals in Weaver, 
that law enforcement‟s use of a GPS device to track a vehicle is 
a search under the State Constitution that requires a warrant 
for its use, has settled the issue as a matter of New York State 
constitutional law.  As a matter of federal constitutional law, 
however, the issue has not been settled.  Although the majority 
opinion in the Appellate Division and the three dissenting 
judges in the Court of Appeals contended that GPS tracking is 
not a search under the federal constitution, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has not considered whether such surveillance is a search 
under the Fourth Amendment and only a handful of federal 
appeals courts have examined the question.142  Nevertheless, 
an examination of the Supreme Court‟s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence generally, as well as its evolving approach to 
Katz-expectation-of-privacy issues, strongly suggests that the 
Supreme Court would consider the use by law enforcement of 
GPS surveillance technology to be a search under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
 
140. Id. at 1212 (Read, J., dissenting). 
141. Id. (Read, J., dissenting). 
142. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007) (not 
a search); United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); 
United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (same).  But 
see, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1980) (search); United 
States v. Shovea, 580 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1978) (same); United States v. 
Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977) (same).  The Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia has recently heard oral argument on the 
constitutionality of warrantless GPS tracking in United States v. Jones, No. 
08-3034 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 17, 2009).  See, e.g., Brief of Appellants, Jones, No. 
08-3034 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 17, 2009), 2009 WL 3155141.  See Editorial, GPS and 
Privacy Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2009, at A26 (discussing the appeal). 
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A. Is Knotts Controlling? 
 
The obvious analytical starting point is United States v. 
Knotts,143 discussed by both the majority and dissenting 
opinions in Weaver.  In Knotts, law enforcement agents tracked 
the progress of a vehicle by following the signals of a battery-
operated beeper that was placed in a five-gallon drum of 
chloroform and that was transported by automobile to its 
destination.144  This surveillance, the Supreme Court observed, 
“amounted principally to the following of an automobile on 
public streets and highways.”145  Thus, according to the 
Supreme Court, the driver “voluntarily conveyed to anyone who 
wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular 
roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he 
made, and the fact of his final destination when he exited from 
public roads onto private property.”146  The Supreme Court 
compared the risk that motorists assume when they travel on 
public roads to the risk that telephone users take when they 
“voluntarily convey” to the telephone company the numbers 
they dial and therefore “assume the risk” that the telephone 
company will reveal that information to the police.147  
Moreover, the Supreme Court added, the fact that the agents 
relied not only on their visual observations, but also on the 
beeper to assist them in following the automobile, did not alter 
the situation.148  Comparing the beeper to a searchlight, marine 
glass, or field glass, the Supreme Court stated: “[n]othing in 
the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting 
the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such 
enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this 
 
143. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
144. Id. at 277. 
145. Id. at 281.  The Court added that automobiles enjoy a lesser 
expectation of privacy than one‟s residence or as a repository of personal 
effects.  “A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny.  It travels 
public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain 
view.”  Id. (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality)). 
146. Id. at 281-82. 
147. Id. at 283.  See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (the 
installation of pen register onto a telephone in order to reveal the numbers 
that were dialed did not intrude upon any reasonable expectation of privacy 
of the phone user). 
148. Id. at 282. 
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case.”149  However, in a cautious response to the defendant‟s 
argument that such a holding presaged the possibility of 
“twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country,”150 
the Supreme Court added: “if such dragnet type law 
enforcement practices as respondent envisions should 
eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine 
whether different constitutional principles may be 
applicable.”151 
In Weaver, the majority acknowledged that “[a]t first 
blush, it would appear that Knotts does not bode well for Mr. 
Weaver.”152  Plainly, as the majority noted, the surveillance 
technology in Knotts was used to track the progress of an 
automobile over public roads and the operator‟s travel and 
routes taken were exposed to “anyone who wanted to look.”153  
However, the majority distinguished Knotts on three grounds, 
all of which are potential arguments that almost certainly will 
be raised in the Supreme Court if and when it considers 
whether law enforcement‟s use of a GPS device is a search 
under the Fourth Amendment: the powerful technology used, 
the ability of this new technology to replace rather than 
augment human sensory perception, and the massive intrusion 
into privacy that the new technology facilitates. 
 
B. New Surveillance Technology 
 
First, the Weaver majority reasoned that the technology 
used in Knotts was “a very primitive tracking device,” as 
compared to the “vastly different and exponentially more 
sophisticated and powerful [GPS] technology that is easily and 
cheaply deployed and has virtually unlimited and remarkably 
precise tracking capability.”154  The new technology is so 
qualitatively and quantitatively different from the beeper in 
Knotts, the majority observed, that its use by law enforcement 
to intrude into privacy interests forces a court to apply the Katz 
 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 283. 
151. Id. at 284. 
152. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1198 (N.Y. 2009). 
153. Id. at 1198-99 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281). 
154. Id. at 1199. 
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expectation-of-privacy doctrine to this new technological 
frontier.155 
The Weaver majority recognized that advances in visual 
surveillance via satellite technology permits, easily and 
cheaply, a massive, intrusive, and unlimited surveillance of 
every citizen any time, any place, and regardless of 
atmospheric conditions.156  The Weaver majority also 
recognized that the introduction of this new technology 
constitutes one of the greatest threats to privacy, and signals 
the need to adjust the Fourth Amendment expectation-of-
privacy doctrine to this new phenomenon.157  Further, Weaver 
recognized that Katz‟s Fourth Amendment expectation-of-
privacy approach offers insufficient protection to individuals 
against indiscriminate use by government officials of modern 
surveillance technology, and that the Court of Appeals should 
not rely on the Supreme Court‟s restrictive interpretation of 
the Fourth Amendment for the protection of individual 
privacy.158 
To be sure, the Supreme Court has not been impervious to 
the “power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed 
privacy,”159 and has recognized that Fourth Amendment search 
and seizure doctrine must evolve to accommodate advances in 
technology.160  Thus, in Dow Chemical Company v. United 
States,161 the Supreme Court held that aerial photography of an 
industrial plant by the Environmental Protection Agency using 
a conventional commercial camera was not a search since 
“[a]ny person with an airplane and an aerial camera could 
readily duplicate them.”162  The Court added that the 
 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. See id. at 1198-99.  See also United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 34 
(2001) (“The question we confront today is what limits there are upon [the] 
power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”). 
158. See Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1202. 
159. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
160. See id. at 36 (“[T]he rule we adopt must take account of more 
sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.”). 
161. 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
162. Id. at 231.  The Court noted that “a casual passenger on an airliner” 
or “a company producing maps” could have taken the pictures.  Id. at 232.  
But see id. at 242 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(camera used by the agency cost in excess of $22,000 and was described as 
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photography was not accomplished by using “sophisticated 
surveillance equipment not generally available to the public, 
such as satellite technology, [which] might be constitutionally 
proscribed absent a warrant,”163 nor were the photographs “so 
revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional 
concerns.”164  Ultimately, however, the Court held that “[t]he 
mere fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to 
the degree here, does not give rise to constitutional 
problems.”165 
Moreover, Weaver‟s attempt to distinguish Knotts by 
emphasizing that the police had used sophisticated GPS 
technology to obtain information not visible to the naked eye 
may find some support in Kyllo v. United States.166  In Kyllo, 
the Supreme Court held that the government‟s use of a new 
infrared technology—an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal 
imager—to detect heat emanating from a person‟s home by 
converting radiation into images based on relative warmth 
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment that 
required a warrant.167  The Court observed that the technology 
used by the government “is not in general public use,” and that 
the device “explore[d] details of the home that would previously 
have been unknowable without physical intrusion.”168  
Acknowledging, as did the majority in Weaver, the potential of 
vast and highly sophisticated satellite and radar technology to 
“shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy,”169 the Court stated 
that “we must take the long view, from the original meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.”170 
 
C. GPS: Enhancement or Replacement 
 
The second ground upon which the Weaver majority 
 
“the finest precision aerial camera available”). 
163. Id. at 238. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
167. Id. at 40. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 34. 
170. Id. at 40. 
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distinguished Knotts was to point out that the beeper in Knotts 
“functioned merely as an enhancing adjunct to the surveilling 
officers‟ senses,” and was used “as a means of maintaining and 
regaining actual visual contact with it.”171  According to the 
majority, the GPS, by contrast, is not a mere “enhancement of 
human sensory capacity.”172  Rather, “it facilitates a new 
technological perception of the world in which the situation of 
any object may be followed and exhaustively recorded over, in 
most cases, a practically unlimited period.”173  For law 
enforcement agents to actually “see” what the GPS “sees,” 
according to the Weaver majority, would require “at a 
minimum, millions of additional police officers and cameras on 
every street lamp.”174 
The extent to which technology “enhances” the human 
senses, as the beeper did in Knotts, and the camera did in Dow 
Chemical, or  “replaces” the human senses, as the thermal 
imager did in Kyllo, is a relevant consideration in analyzing 
whether surveillance technology constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search.  According to Judge Smith‟s dissenting 
opinion in Weaver, the GPS merely augmented information 
that the police could have obtained anyway.  “It is beyond any 
question,” Judge Smith contended, that the police could have 
obtained the “same information” that was obtained by using 
the GPS by “assign[ing] an officer, or a team of officers, to 
follow [Weaver] everywhere he went.”175  However, while 
theoretically possible, Judge Smith‟s position is untenable as a 
practical matter and unrealistic.  It is inconceivable that, given 
budgetary constraints on police work, finite time pressures for 
different and competing investigations, and limited police 
personnel, the police would have been able to “tail” Weaver 
every hour of every day for sixty-five days to get the 
information they used to convict him.  Indeed, the use of a 
beeper, as in Knotts, did not replace police surveillance but 
merely enabled the police to maintain visual contact with an 
 
171. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009). 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 1204 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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already suspicious vehicle.176  It is therefore implausible to 
think of the GPS as an “enhancement” of what could be seen 
with the naked eye, just as it is implausible to construe the 
thermal imager in Kyllo as an enhancement of what could be 
seen by watching snow melt off a portion of the roof of a 
house.177  Indeed, it would be equally implausible to think of 
GPS as enhancing the surveillance that could have been 
accomplished by a police officer hiding in the back seat of 
Weaver‟s van for sixty-five days. 
Moreover, to the extent that the Katz expectation-of-
privacy formulation, as it was applied in Knotts and other 
cases, includes a reference to a person who “voluntarily 
conveys” information to “anyone who wanted to look”—the 
motorist traveling on public roads in Knotts,178 or the telephone 
user dialing numbers in Smith v. Maryland179—it is completely 
inapplicable to technology that replaces human sensory 
perception.  Indeed, most people probably would acknowledge 
that one of the risks in modern society is exposure to 
technology that augments that which is visible to the naked 
eye—i.e., the beeper in Knotts, the camera in Dow Chemical, as 
well as surveillance cameras in many public places.  Moreover, 
it is not unreasonable to suggest that people may be deemed to 
have “voluntarily conveyed” to the outside world information 
about their public activities that is visible to the outside world 
by virtue of this “augmenting” technology.  However, it is 
unreasonable, even perverse, to suggest that persons have 
“voluntarily conveyed” to sophisticated technology the capacity 
to “see” them up close constantly, continuously, and for an 
infinite period of time, to “record” detailed information as to 
their movements through the world, to “transmit” to the 
government all of the personal data that has been collected, 
and to “retain” this information for an indefinite and unlimited 
period of time. 
 
176. See United States v. Berry, 300 F. Supp. 2d 366, 368 (D. Md. 2004) 
(“Beepers placed on cars merely help the police stay in contact with the 
vehicle that they are actively „tailing.‟”). 
177. But see United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(GPS technology not a “substitute” for activity of “following a car on a public 
street”). 
178. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
179. See 442 U.S. 735 (1970). 
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By the same token, the inclusion in the Katz formulation of 
the concept of “assumption of the risk” is also seriously out of 
place in the context of technology that is used as a substitute 
for the use of human senses.  It may well be that when people 
move about in public, or talk to other people, they assume a 
risk that their actions will be seen and photographed, and their 
words heard and recorded.  Notwithstanding an abstract “right 
to be let alone,” these are risks that the Fourth Amendment 
imposes on privacy interests, and one of the most contentious 
issues underlying the Katz expectation-of-privacy analysis.180  
However, it is one thing to suggest that a person assumes a 
risk that his words may be recorded by a listener, or his actions 
photographed by an observer; it is a far more dubious and even 
dangerous contention that privacy expectations under the 
Fourth Amendment require citizens to assume the risk that 
they will be “seen” constantly, continuously, and for an 
unlimited period of time by government‟s omnipresent and 
pervasive “Orwellian” surveillance technology, without any 
judicial oversight or constitutional constraints.181 
 
D. Degrees of Intrusions into Privacy 
 
The third ground upon which the Weaver majority 
distinguished Knotts was to contrast the limited and discrete 
intrusion in Knotts with the unlimited and prolonged intrusion 
 
180. See 1 WAYNE LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 313 (2d ed. 1987) (“[T]he fundamental inquiry is 
whether [a government] practice, if not subjected to Fourth Amendment 
restraints, would be intolerable because it would either encroach too much 
upon the „sense of security‟ or impose unreasonable burdens upon those who 
wished to maintain that security.”). 
181. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1048-49 (Or. 1988). 
 
Conversations in public may be overheard, but it is 
relatively easy to avoid eavesdroppers by lowering the voice 
or moving away.  Moreover, one can be reasonably sure of 
whether one will be overheard.  But if the state‟s position in 
this case is correct, no movement, no location and no 
conversation in a „public place‟ would in any measure be 
secure from the prying of the government. 
 
Id. 
27
954 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3 
 
in Weaver.  The beeper in Knotts, as the Weaver majority 
observed, was used to enable the police to “tail” an automobile 
during one single trip that involved “a focused binary police 
investigation for the discreet purpose of ascertaining the 
destination of a particular container of chloroform.”182  The 
GPS device, according to the Weaver majority, involved a 
“massive invasion of privacy”183 by exposing “the whole of a 
person‟s progress through the world, into both public and 
private spatial spheres, [which] can be charted and recorded 
over lengthy periods.”184  As the majority observed, GPS could 
reveal “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the 
abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the 
criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union 
meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on 
and on.”185  GPS can thereby reveal and record “with 
breathtaking quality and quantity . . . a highly detailed profile, 
not simply of where we go, but by easy inference, of our 
associations—political, religious, amicable and amorous, to 
name only a few—and of the pattern of our professional and 
avocational pursuits.”186 
The dissenting opinion of Judge Smith in the Court of 
Appeals attempted to minimize the magnitude of the GPS 
intrusion by adopting an “all-or-nothing” interpretation of 
Knotts.  That is, Judge Smith suggested, “an officer, or a team 
of officers,” could have followed Weaver everywhere he went, 
whether it involved trips to the psychiatrist‟s office or the gay 
bar, and could have recorded, photographed, filmed, and 
reported the “same information” that was obtained from the 
GPS, as long as Weaver remained in public places.187  
According to Judge Smith, once a person decides to expose his 
identity and activities to the world by driving in a car on a 
 
182. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009). 
183. Id. at 1201. 
184. Id. at 1199. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 1199-1200.  See State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (Wash. 
2003) (en banc) (“In this age, vehicles are used to take people to a vast 
number of places that can reveal preferences, alignments, associations, 
personal ails and foibles.  The GPS tracking devices record all of these 
travels, and thus can provide a detailed picture of one‟s life.”). 
187. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1204 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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public road—at any particular moment, as in Knotts—then he 
or she has assumed the risk of exposing his or her identity and 
activities continuously and indefinitely.188  But Judge Smith 
did not acknowledge the practical and logistical difficulties that 
law enforcement would face in trying to obtain the “same 
information” by the visual and beeper surveillance used in 
Knotts.  Further, Judge Smith did not acknowledge any 
differences in terms of the quality and intensity of the 
intrusion into privacy interests between the limited visual and 
beeper surveillance in Knotts and the GPS surveillance in 
Weaver. 
Yet in distinguishing Knotts, this is precisely what the 
Weaver majority recognized.  One of the central themes of the 
Supreme Court‟s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is, in fact, 
the existence of different degrees of intrusions by government 
into privacy interests, and the extent to which these different 
degrees of intrusion require different levels of justification.  For 
example, in Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court recognized that, 
while the government‟s interest in investigating reasonably 
suspicious behavior authorized police to forcibly detain an 
individual for a limited period of time, this temporary 
detention did not justify the greater intrusion of a search of the 
suspect.189  However, as the Supreme Court ruled, there does 
exist a justification for a lesser intrusion—a “pat down” or 
“frisk” of the suspect.190  The Supreme Court “emphatically 
reject[ed]” the government‟s argument that a “frisk” of a 
suspect was merely a “petty indignity” that did not rise to the 
level of a search under the Fourth Amendment.191  Although a 
frisk is not as intrusive as a full-blown search, a frisk “is a 
serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may 
inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment.”192 
The existence of degrees of intrusions into privacy—which 
the Weaver majority recognized and which Judge Smith did 
not—is also demonstrated by Camara v. Municipal Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco, where the Supreme Court 
 
188. See id. (Smith, J., dissenting). 
189. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 25 (1968). 
190. Id. at 24-25. 
191. Id. at 16-17. 
192. Id. at 17. 
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recognized that an administrative inspection of a home for code 
violations is not as intrusive as a search conducted pursuant to 
a criminal investigation, and that therefore, although a 
“significant intrusion,” such a search requires less 
justification.193  Moreover, where intrusions into privacy 
interests are “minimal,” such as being subjected to drug194 and 
blood testing,195 the Supreme Court has authorized intrusions 
into a person‟s body that require only minimal justification, 
whereas more extensive intrusions into bodily privacy and 
bodily integrity require greater justification.196 
Furthermore, just as the Supreme Court has recognized 
that government intrusions into privacy vary widely in terms of 
nature and scope, and that judicial responses require different 
levels of justification, so has the Supreme Court recognized the 
existence of varying levels of expectations of privacy.  Thus, the 
Court has recognized different expectations of privacy with 
respect to different places, such as homes,197 containers,198 and 
vehicles.199  Moreover, although the Supreme Court in some 
 
193. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967). 
194. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives‟ Ass‟n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 
(1989) (“[P]rivacy interests implicated by the search are minimal.”). 
195. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (intrusion not 
significant since such tests “are a commonplace”). 
196. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985) (surgery to 
remove bullet). 
197. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“Fourth 
Amendment draws „a firm line at the entrance to the house‟” (quoting Payton 
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980))); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 
505, 511 (1961) (“At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the 
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion.”). 
198. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) (finding a 
privacy interest in luggage because the luggage was not open to public view, 
not subject to regular inspections and official scrutiny, and is intended as a 
repository of personal effects).  The Court has also recognized, however, 
degrees on intrusions into the privacy of luggage.  See United States v. Place, 
462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (notwithstanding that a person possesses a privacy 
interest in the contents of personal luggage, a “canine sniff” by a well-trained 
narcotics detection dog “is much less intrusive than a typical search”). 
199. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973) (finding a 
diminished expectation of privacy for automobiles because of requirements 
that automobiles be registered, periodically inspected, their operators be 
licensed, the existence of regulations concerning the manner in which they 
may be operated, and the occasional seizure of them in the interests of public 
safety). 
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contexts has taken an “all-or-nothing” approach to expectations 
of privacy,200 it has also recognized that the reasonableness of 
expectations of privacy may vary depending on the nature and 
extent of the government‟s intrusion.  Thus, in Bond v. United 
States, the Supreme Court held that the exploratory 
manipulation of the outside of a bus passenger‟s canvas bag by 
a narcotics agent was an excessive intrusion into the 
passenger‟s reasonable expectation of privacy in his bag.201  
Although a bus passenger “clearly expects that his bag may be 
handled. . . [h]e does not expect that other passengers or bus 
employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an 
exploratory manner.”202  Similarly, in Dow Chemical, the 
Supreme Court held that, while aerial photographs of an 
industrial plant did not intrude into a legitimate expectation of 
privacy since a casual passenger in an airplane could have 
taken the same photographs, surveillance of private property 
by using “highly sophisticated” satellite technology that could 
reveal “intimate details” might be such an excessive intrusion 
as to implicate constitutional concerns.203  Further, the Court 
has recognized that even though a person possesses a privacy 
interest in the contents of personal luggage,204 a “canine sniff” 
of that luggage by a well-trained narcotics detection dog is not 
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.205  The 
sniff, according to the Court in United States v. Place, while an 
intrusion, does not expose non-contraband items that otherwise 
would remain hidden, and discloses only the presence or 
absence of narcotics.206  “[T]his investigative technique,” said 
the Court, “is much less intrusive than a typical search.”207  
Finally, in Mancusi v. DeForte, the Supreme Court recognized 
a difference in the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy 
depending on the identity of the intruder.208  In Mancusi, the 
 
200. See Doernberg, supra note 21, at 295 (describing the Supreme 
Court‟s “muddled view of privacy as an all-or-nothing concept”). 
201. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000). 
202. Id. 
203. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986). 
204. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977). 
205. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968). 
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Court held that a union official had no reasonable expectation 
of privacy with respect to his union superiors, but that he did 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the 
government.209 
These cases all recognize that there can be a legally 
significant difference in terms of the degree, scope, and 
duration of an intrusion into privacy.210  That difference is 
particularly stark between the visual and beeper surveillance 
used in Knotts, and the GPS surveillance used in Weaver.  
Being watched by the government on one discrete occasion, as 
in Knotts, and being watched constantly and continuously for 
sixty-five days, as in Weaver, are so different as to require 
different constitutional responses.  Moreover, there is some 
empirical evidence to suggest that society recognizes the 
difference between the two.211  In addition, Congress has 
enacted legislation requiring a judicial warrant for electronic 
tracking devices.212  This evidence suggests that most people do 
not expect that the government will be watching their every 
movement and the locations of their travel routes and 
destinations for an extended period of time.  This kind of 
“dragnet” intrusion into privacy conjures up Orwellian images 
of “mass surveillance” of motorists picked at random by the 
 
209. Id. at 369. 
210. The Court has also recognized that intrusions into possessory 
interests can vary in their intensity.  See Place, 462 U.S. at 705 (“The 
intrusion on possessory interests occasioned by a seizure of one‟s personal 
effects can vary both in its nature and extent.”).  As to whether the 
attachment of the GPS device constitutes a seizure, see infra Part III. 
211. See Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of 
Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213 (2002) (according 
to a survey, the intrusiveness of police using camera surveillance of a public 
street where the tapes are retained is of far greater concern than where tapes 
are destroyed).  See also Ben Hubbard, Police Turn to Secret Weapon: GPS 
Device, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Aug. 13, 2008, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/08/12/AR2008081203275.html (follow “Poll”) (stating 
that sixty percent of 3,008 responders believed that the “growing use of GPS 
technology by police departments to track criminal suspects marks [a] 
troubling trend”). 
212. See 18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) (2006) (authorizing courts to issue warrants 
for installation of mobile tracking devices).  But see United States v. 
Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding that Congress 
understood that “warrants are not always required for either the installation 
or use of mobile tracking devices”). 
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government, and using digital search techniques to identify 
suspicious patterns of behavior.213  Whether such a massive 
surveillance program constitutes a Fourth Amendment search 
that requires a warrant, or instead is merely an “efficient 
alternative to hiring another [ten] million police officers to tail 
every vehicle on the nation‟s roads”214 is a federal question that 
the Supreme Court one day may answer; but, as a result of 
People v. Weaver, it is a question that has been definitively and 
conclusively answered by the New York State Court of Appeals 
under the State Constitution. 
Finally, given the profound effect of technology to increase 
the ability of law enforcement to scrutinize any given 
individual, or many of them,215 the “ultimate question” posed 
by Professor Anthony Amsterdam is “whether, if [a] particular 
form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go 
unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy 
and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a 
compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open 
society.”216  It is hardly an answer, as Judge Smith argues in 
his dissent, to claim that since criminals will use the most 
modern and efficient tools available to them, and will not get 
warrants to do so, the courts should not impose restraints on 
the ability of the police to employ the same technology to catch 
them.217  Contrary to this hyperbole, however, there is no 
 
213. See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 
One can imagine the police affixing GPS tracking devices to 
thousands of cars at random, recovering the devices, and 
using digital search techniques to identify suspicious 
driving patterns.  One can even imagine a law requiring all 
new cars to come equipped with the device so that the 
government can keep track of all vehicular movement in the 
United States. 
 
Id. 
214. Id. 
215. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) (“It would be 
foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth 
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”). 
216. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth 
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 403 (1974). 
217. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1204 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, J., 
dissenting). 
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suggestion in Weaver that police may not use technology to 
solve crime.  The majority simply requires that the police 
obtain a warrant to do so, which police have been required to 
do for centuries. 
 
III.  GPS Tracking as a Seizure 
 
The Supreme Court has declared that a government 
“seizure” of property occurs “when there is some meaningful 
interference with an individual‟s possessory interests in that 
property.”218  Under the Supreme Court‟s definition, the 
attachment of the GPS should constitute a “meaningful 
interference” with the owner‟s right to use his property 
exclusively for his own purpose and to exclude everyone else 
from his property, including the government.219  Whether the 
attachment of the beeper in Knotts, or that of the GPS in 
Weaver, “meaningfully interferes” with an individual‟s 
possessory interest in that property is an open question under 
both the federal and New York State constitutions.  Neither the 
Supreme Court in Knotts, nor the Court of Appeals in Weaver, 
addressed that question.220 
Interestingly, the Massachusetts Supreme Court recently 
decided the question.  In Commonwealth v. Connolly, the court 
found that police had seized the defendant‟s vehicle by entering 
his van for one hour to install a GPS device, and by operating 
the van‟s electrical system in order to attach the device to the 
 
218. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).  See United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (“In the ordinary case, the Court has 
viewed a seizure of personal property as per se unreasonable within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment unless it is accomplished pursuant to a 
judicial warrant issued upon probable cause and particularly describing the 
items to be seized.”). 
219. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 729 (1984) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
220. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“I think this would have been a much more difficult case if 
respondent had challenged, not merely certain aspects of the monitoring of 
the beeper installed in the chloroform container purchased by respondent‟s 
compatriot, but also its original installation.”); Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1204 
(Smith, J., dissenting) (“[S]urreptitious attachment of the device to the car . . 
. goes virtually unmentioned.”).  The Court in Knotts noted that several 
Courts of Appeals approved the warrantless installations of beepers.  460 
U.S. at 279 n. (unnumbered footnote). 
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vehicle‟s power source and verify that it was operating 
properly.221  The court stated that the operation of the GPS, 
which had required power from the defendant‟s vehicle, was 
“an ongoing physical intrusion.”222  The court also found that a 
seizure occurred regardless of whether the GPS draws power 
from the vehicle.223  “It is a seizure,” the court declared, “not by 
virtue of the technology employed, but because the police use 
private property (the vehicle) to obtain information for their 
own purposes.”224  The continual monitoring by the police 
transformed the vehicle into a “messenger” for the 
government,225 as well as “substantially infring[ing] on another 
meaningful possessory interest in the minivan: the defendant‟s 
use and enjoyment of his vehicle.”226 
In his dissent in Weaver, Judge Smith explicitly addressed 
this “hard” question—whether the installation of the GPS 
constituted a seizure.227  Although he was “troubled” by what 
he considered a “trespass” that violated the defendant‟s 
property rights,228 he concluded, “with some hesitation,” that 
the trespass did not violate the defendant‟s right to be free 
from unreasonable searches.229  Judge Richard Posner reached 
a similar conclusion in United States v. Garcia.230  Judge 
Posner held that it is “untenable” to claim that the 
government‟s attachment of a GPS device underneath the 
defendant‟s vehicle constituted a Fourth Amendment 
seizure.231  The GPS device, he noted, “did not affect the car‟s 
driving qualities, did not draw power from the car‟s engine or 
battery, did not take up [any] room that might . . . have been 
occupied by passengers or packages, [and] did not . . . alter the 
 
221. Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 369 (Mass. 2009). 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at 370. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1205 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, J., 
dissenting). 
228. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). 
229. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). 
230. 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007). 
231. Id. at 996. 
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car‟s appearance.”232  In short, he said, the attachment “did not 
„seize‟ the car in any intelligible sense of the word.”233 
However, there is an alternative interpretation of a seizure 
that follows the reasoning of Justice Stevens in his concurring 
and dissenting opinion in United States v. Karo.234  According 
to Justice Stevens, by attaching an electronic monitoring device 
to a car, the government asserted “dominion and control” over 
the car,235 and “in a fundamental sense . . . converted the 
property to its own use,” thereby depriving the owner of the 
right to use his property exclusively.236  Such interference is 
also “meaningful,” according to Justice Stevens, because “the 
character of the property is profoundly different when infected 
with an electronic bug than when it is entirely germ free.”237 
Lending support to Justice Stevens‟s view of the meaning 
of a seizure is Silverman v. United States.238  In Silverman, the 
Supreme Court held that the attachment of a listening device 
to the heating duct of an apartment building in order to 
overhear conversations “usurp[ed]” the owner‟s property rights 
without his knowledge or consent.239  The Court refused to 
consider whether such intrusion into a person‟s tangible 
property interests may have constituted a “technical trespass” 
under “ancient niceties of tort or real property law,”240 because 
it clearly implicated the Fourth Amendment right of a person 
to exclusive and exclusionary use of his or her property.241 
In his dissenting opinion in Weaver, Judge Smith 
attempted to draw a “fine distinction” between property rights 
and privacy rights.242  Judge Smith acknowledged that the 
 
232. Id. 
233. Id. 
234. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
235. Id. at 730 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“„[A]ssert[ing] dominion and control‟ is a „seizure‟ in the most basic sense of 
the term.” (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120 (1984))). 
236. Id. at 729 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
237. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
238. 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
239. Id. at 511. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. 
242. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1206 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, J., 
dissenting). 
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police did trespass onto the defendant‟s property and thereby 
violated his property rights.243  However, according to Judge 
Smith, the attachment of the GPS device “did not invade his 
privacy.”244  As Judge Smith elaborated, Weaver‟s car was 
parked on a public street and “[n]o one who chooses to park in 
such a location can reasonably think that the outside—even the 
underside—of the car is in a place of privacy.”245  While Judge 
Smith acknowledged that a person may reasonably expect that 
others will leave his car alone and not tamper with it by 
sneaking underneath of it and installing electronic devices, 
that is not an expectation of privacy, but “an expectation of 
respect for one‟s property rights.”246  The distinction between a 
defendant‟s “property” interest and his “privacy” interest, 
Judge Smith observed, although a “fine distinction,” is 
nevertheless a “critical” distinction.247  A trespass to private 
property is not a search when that private property is located 
in a public place, Judge Smith argued, unless information is 
acquired that the property owner reasonably expected to keep 
private.248  Thus, although disapproving “the idea of a police 
officer—or anyone else—sneaking under someone‟s car in the 
middle of the night to attach a tracking device,”249 Judge Smith 
concluded that however “distasteful,”250 a court should not, in 
effect, expand privacy rights beyond those guaranteed by the 
state and federal constitutions. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The Katz expectation-of-privacy test requires a person who 
claims the protection of the Fourth Amendment to demonstrate 
both a subjective expectation of privacy and an expectation of 
privacy that society considers reasonable.  However, as this 
 
243. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). 
244. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). 
245. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). 
246. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). 
247. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). 
248. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).  Judge Smith cited Bond v. United 
States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000) where the Court suppressed drugs discovered by a 
narcotics agent by manipulating the outer portion of the defendant‟s luggage. 
249. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1205 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
250. Id. at 1206 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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Article has shown, the Katz test may be inadequate with 
respect to intrusions into privacy interests that involve highly 
sophisticated surveillance technology.  The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
must evolve with the advances of science and technology.  The 
question presented to the New York Court of Appeals in People 
v. Weaver was whether the federal or state constitution offered 
protection to a defendant where law enforcement officials had 
attached a GPS device to his vehicle and monitored his travels 
every hour of every day for sixty-five days, and used 
information from the surveillance to convict him of a burglary. 
Given the fact that the Supreme Court had not addressed 
this issue, and that a related precedent in the Supreme Court, 
United States v. Knotts, involved the use by law enforcement of 
a much less sophisticated tracking device, the Court of Appeals 
chose not to analyze the case under the Federal Constitution 
and distinguish Knotts, but rather to apply the State 
Constitution.  The Court of Appeals found that under the State 
Constitution, the attachment of the GPS and the prolonged 
surveillance was a search.  As the Court of Appeals 
persuasively demonstrated, the degree and magnitude of GPS 
surveillance involves such a massive invasion of privacy that a 
judicial warrant is required for its use.  Moreover, although the 
Court of Appeals did not address the issue, there are 
respectable arguments that the government‟s surreptitious 
installation of a GPS device to a vehicle constitutes a seizure 
because such conduct interferes with a person‟s property 
interests in a sufficiently meaningful way. 
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